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UNDISCLOSED RECORDING OF
CONVERSATIONS BY PRIVATE
ATTORNEYS
I. INTRODUCTION
The law reluctantly embraces the future. For example, a funda-
mental precept of American jurisprudence, the doctrine of stare deci-
sis, commands the court to search precedent to determine the proper
rule to apply in a given case. Society, on the other hand, welcomes the
future and innovation.
Technological advances in the preservation of conversations tempt
some attorneys to memorialize their conversations on tape. The capac-
ity to preserve conversations is a tremendous power in a profession
that deals with words and their meanings. Virtually every state recog-
nizes the admissibility of sound recordings into evidence.' Indeed, a
recorded statement has more evidentiary value than a written state-
ment because it presents the speaker's exact words in his own voice,
and retains his tone, inflection and emphasis.2 In the past, private at-
torneys have recorded judges, other attorneys, clients, and witnesses.
Because of the power of this evidence, bodies charged with the inter-
pretation and enforcement of ethical rules have placed restrictions on
private attorneys obtaining and using recordings. Courts have disci-
plined attorneys for secretly recording conversations; punishment has
varied from private censure to disbarment. Virtually all the published
opinions share a common distaste for eavesdropping.
This Note addresses the ethical implications of private counsel's
procuring and using secret recordings. This Note also analyzes views on
the employment of secret recordings by private lawyers reported in
American Bar Association (ABA) ethical opinions, state ethical opin-
ions, reported opinions of disciplinary proceedings against attorneys,
and evidentiary rulings on the use of recordings made by private coun-
sel in the context of litigation.
3
1. See Annotation, Admissibility of Sound Recordings in Evidence, 58 AL.R.2D
1024 (1958).
2. State v. Reyes, 209 Or. 595, 636, 308 P.2d 182, 196 (1957).
3. Specifically excluded from this discussion is the "prosecutorial exception" ap-
plied to government attorneys. The prosecutorial exception will be discussed only when
it involves undisclosed recordings made by private counsel who represent a criminal
defendant.
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II. RECORDING THE COURT AND JUDICIARY
The ABA's informal opinion C-480 expressly allows an attorney to
make a recording of a court proceeding.4 The opinion provides that the
attorney who makes the recording must fully disclose to the court and
opposing counsel his intent to record.5 When a lawyer falls to inform
the court or opposing counsel that he is recording the proceeding, he
violates his duty of candor and fairness in dealing with the court.6 The
attorney's recording of the proceeding is a "material fact" that the at-
torney must disclose to the court and opposing counsel.
7
In People v. Selby" disciplinary proceedings were initiated against
an attorney, Selby, for covertly recording a preliminary hearing and a
meeting in the judge's chambers. The judge had overruled Selby's ob-
jections at the preliminary hearing, and as a result Selby refused to
participate any further in the proceedings. The judge requested the
prosecutor and Selby to come back to chambers to discuss the criminal
charges filed against Selby's client. Selby later used a partial transcrip-
tion of the conversation in a motion to disqualify the judge.9
Selby testified before the grievance committee that he recorded
the proceedings and conversation because his arm had been in a cast
and he had been unable to take notes. Selby also stated that the re-
corder was visible throughout the conference. However, both the judge
and the prosecutor denied seeing the recorder during either the hear-
ing proceedings or the conference in chambers." The court found
Selby's justifications to be patently false. In its report, the grievance
committee noted that Selby deliberately and willfully lied about his
motives and the manner in which the recording was obtained."' The
court observed that Selby's conduct violated the attorney's duty of
candor and fairness because "[i]nherent in the undisclosed use of a re-
cording device is an element of deception, artifice, and trickery which
does not comport with the high standards of candor and fairness by
which all attorneys are bound."' 2 Thus, Selby's acts violated Colorado's
4. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. C-480 (1961).
5. Id.
6. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY DR 7-102 (1980); CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIcs Canon 22
(1956).
7. See supra note 6.
8. 198 Colo. 386, 606 P.2d 45 (1979).
9. Id. at 389, 606 P.2d at 46.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 390, 606 P.2d at 47. The court also cited People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v.
Ellis, 101 Colo. 101, 70 P.2d 346 (1937); Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics, Op. 22 (1962); and ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 337 (1974).
[Vol. 42
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss4/11
UNDISCLOSED RECORDINGS
DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6). 1"
Selby added to his improper conduct by distorting the content of
the recording by using partial quotations taken out of context in his
motion to disqualify the judge.14 This misrepresentation of fact vio-
lated Colorado's DR 7-102(A)(5). 15 However, it is unclear from the
opinion whether the attorney's improper use of the recording or the
attorney's failure to inform the judge and prosecutor was the "misrep-
resentation of fact" that fell within the rule.
Selby subsequently was disbarred.'6 It is difficult to determine the
extent to which the court disciplined Selby solely for the act of making
the recording. The attorney's misuse of the recording and his conduct
after recording the conversation in chambers were cited as justification
for the disciplinary action independent of the manner in which the re-
cording was made.
If the facts in Selby are modified so that the only impropriety was
the making of the recording, the holding implicates Sixth Amendment
concerns.17 Assume Selby made the recording secretly and in the
course of the conversation the judge made statements that, when taken
in context, called for the judge's disqualification. An attorney who
wishes to represent his client effectively should seek the judge's re-
moval. If the lawyer files an affidavit and the judge denies the state-
ments, a swearing contest develops. If the attorney then reveals the
tape, both attorney and judge could be disbarred under the holding of
Selby: the lawyer for taping the conversation and the judge for denying
its contents. Although the true issue here is the conversation between
the judge and the attorney, the system overlooks this dispute and in-
stead focuses on the recording. The shift in emphasis to the recording
interferes with the client's right to an impartial tribunal and his attor-
ney's duty to his client.
This scenario is similar to the facts in In re Warner.'8 In that case
the South Carolina Supreme Court publicly reprimanded an attorney
13. "(A) A lawyer shall not:... (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation.. . . (6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law." Selby, 198 Colo. at 389, 606 P.2d at 46.
14. Id. at 390, 606 P.2d at 47.
15. "(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: . . . (5) Knowingly
make a false statement of law or fact.. . . (8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct
or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule." Id. at 388, 606 P.2d at 46.
16. Id. at 390, 606 P.2d at 47. Although the punishment seems quite severe, Selby
had many prior encounters with the disciplinary system in Colorado. Selby previously
received two private reprimands, one public reprimand, and had been disbarred but rein-
stated after convincing the court he had rehabilitated himself. Id. at 387, 606 P.2d at 45.
17. The Sixth Amendment provides, in part, "the accused shall... have the assis-
tance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18. 286 S.C. 459, 335 S.E.2d 90 (1985).
1991]
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for sending a client into a family court judge's chamber to make a re-
cording of a conference between the judge and the client.'9 The court
extended its prior prohibition against secretly recording an adversary
or potential adversary 0 to include recording other attorneys and any
other person.
21
The attorney defended the charges of impropriety on the ground
that his client had made statements that "required" him to attempt to
gather "hard evidence" against the judge.22 The court rejected this jus-
tification and noted that the attorney had attempted, "at best, to take
the law into his own hands and, at worst, to bring discredit upon the
legal profession.123 The court observed that the proper course of action
was to report any knowledge of impropriety to the Judicial Standards
Committee. 24 Thus, the court rejected a motive-based inquiry2 in
favor of a broad restraint against secret recordings of any kind.26
III. RECORDING OTHER ATTORNEYS
Presence before a court, however, does not determine the impro-
priety of a recording. The ABA also disapproves of secret recordings
between attorneys engaged in litigation. 21 'Citing Canon 22,28 the com-
mittee held that making a secret verbatim transcript of a conversation
violates an attorney's obligation of candor and fairness in dealings with
19. Id. A private investigator supplied the recording device to the client. Id. at 460,
335 S.E.2d at 90. The fact that the attorney did not provide the recording equipment
was immaterial because the attorney directed the client to use the equipment to record
the conference with the judge. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity, Informal Op. 1320 (1975); see infra note 50 and accompanying text.
20. See In re Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 283 S.C. 369, 322 S.E.2d 667
(1934); see infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
21. Warner, 286 S.C. at 461, 335 S.E.2d at 91.
22. Id. The attorney also argued for mitigation on the grounds that the question
was "novel." Id. The court did not refer to its prior holding that prohibited an attorney
from recording adverse parties. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. Thus, the
court implied a distinction between the relationship of an attorney to a judge, from that
of an attorney and a potential adversary.
23. Id. at 461, 335 S.E.2d at 91.
24. Id.
25. See People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Ellis, 101 Colo. 101, 70 P.2d 346 (1974)
(Burke, J., dissenting); see infra note 65 and accompanying text.
26. "[L]awyers simply do not participate in any manner in the furtive recordings of
judges in their chambers. It is equally reprehensible and impermissible for an attorney
to secretly record another attorney or, indeed, another person.. . . We will not tolerate
such conduct." Warner, 286 S.C. at 461-62, 335 S.E.2d at 91 (emphasis in original).
27. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 1009 (1967).
28. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 22 (1956). See also MODEL Rutrs op
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILTY
DR 7-102 (1980).
[Vol. 42
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other attorneys. 9
The ABA has condemned the interest of a disciplinary board in-
vestigator to monitor conversations between an attorney charged with
misconduct and his client, even with the client's consent.30 The ABA
had resolved in an earlier opinion 31 that preparing electronic record-
ings, although legal under federal law, violates a lawyer's duty "not [to]
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresen-
tation." 2 The ABA concluded that recordings made by attorneys are
proper only if all parties to the conversation know that the recording is
being made. To do otherwise offends "the standards of professional
conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, with
9133the legal system, and with the legal profession ....
Assume, however, that the investigator suspects that the attorney
is engaged in illegal activity with a client. Arguably, recording conver-
sations that relate to illegal activities is ethical. Formal opinion 337
indicates, however, that secret electronic'surveilance can be permitted
only in extraordinary circumstances in which government lawyers act
"within strict statutory limitations conforming to constitutional re-
quirements. 3 4 The attorney-client privilege and the sanctity of the at-
torney-client relationship are fundamental concerns of the Sixth
Amendment.3 5 A lawyer must have an unimpeded flow of communica-
tion with his client in order to represent the client effectively. If the
client suspects his attorney's office is being monitored, the client may
withhold information.36 The ABA's blanket prohibition against secret
recordings of other private attorneys indirectly ensures the free flow of
information which protects Sixth Amendment interests.
29. The committee did not address the legality or the wisdom of making the
recording.
30. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1407
(1978).
31. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974).
See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
32. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974)
(citing MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrry DR 1-102(A)(4) (1969)). See also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 8.4(c) (1983).
33. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974)
(citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1969)).
34. Id.
35. See United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 263 (C.D. Cal. 1982), overruled on
other grounds, United States v. Zolin, 842 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd in part, va-
cated in part, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
36. Similar Sixth Amendment concerns arise when a lawyer cooperates with gov-
ermnent authorities investigating potential criminal activities of his client. See infra
notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
1991]
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IV. RECORDING THIRD PERSONS
In its seminal opinion 37 addressing the use of recorded conversa-
tions, the ABA condemned, as ethically improper, the admission into
evidence of a covertly recorded conversation between a criminal de-
fendant, his attorney, and an unrepresented codefendant. In this opin-
ion, investigators made the recording while the defendant and code-
fendant were in custody. In the course of the conversation, the
defendants made damaging admissions regarding their intentions to re-
cant earlier statements. Moreover, the attorney counseled them on how
to proceed should they escape from prison. The prosecutor wished to
admit the recording into evidence at trial.
The opinion conceded that the recording was legally admissible,
"even though obtained by unlawful means."38 Nevertheless, the com-
mittee believed that the prosecuting attorney's conduct gave the ap-
pearance of impropriety. Consequently, the committee determined it
would be "professionally improper" for the prosecutor to seek admis-
sion of the tapes3s
The committee placed special importance on the confidential na-
ture of the intercepted communication and the need to encourage can-
dor between the attorney and his client.'0 Formal opinion 150 subordi-
nates concern for the substance of the conversation in favor of systemic
vigilance for the integrity of the attorney-client relationship and the
free flow of information.'
1
The most extensive opinion issued by the ABA that deals with se-
cret recordings incorporates prior decisions of the committee and
places a broad prohibition on undisclosed recordings by private attor-
neys. Formal opinion 33742 recognizes three classes of people that may
be parties to a surreptitiously recorded conversation: clients, other at-
37. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 150 (1936).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The opinion does not discuss the effect of the unrepresented codefendant's
presence on the privileged nature of the conversation. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, WIG-
MORE ON EVIDENCE § 2311 (1961) (presence of a stranger to a conversation between an
attorney and his client strips conversation of its privileged character). The committee
noted that although the attorney represented only one defendant, he was advising both
of them during the conversation. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 150 (1936).
41. The committee expressly censured the attorney for advising his client about
what to do in the event of escape. The committee further stated that it would be equally
unethical for the attorney to allow his client to swear that statements given to law en-
forcement officers were compelled when he knew from his client that the statements were
made voluntarily. Id.
42. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974).
1000 [Vol. 42
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torneys, and the public. The committee noted that it had addressed
specifically the propriety of recording conversations with other attor-
neys43 and clients.44 The committee addressed the general issue of the
propriety of making undisclosed recordings and determined that pri-
vate attorneys may not ethically record conversations without full dis-
closure to all parties.
45
The committee reasoned that undisclosed recordings of third per-
sons would be improper given the committee's prior opinions on the
issue of secretly recording clients and other attorneys. Although fed-
era 46 and state laws allow surreptitious recordings, an attorney must
avoid any appearance of impropriety when dealing with the public.
47
Furthermore, an attorney is prohibited from engaging in fraudulent,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct.48 The committee decided that mak-
ing secret recordings, even when legal, offends attorneys' ethical obliga-
tions and falls outside "conduct to which lawyers should aspire.' 4
The committee subsequently extended formal opinion 337 to pro-
hibit secret recordings made by an attorney's employee, client, or any-
one else under the direction of the attorney."
Almost every state has determined that it is unethical for a lawyer
to tape a conversation without full disclosure that a verbatim record is
being made. Several states have adopted formal opinion 337 with little
or no comment.51 Some state opinions prohibit surreptitious recordings
43. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 1009 (1967).
See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
44. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 1008 (1967).
See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
45. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974).
46. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982)
(requiring one party consent to the recording of a conversation if the recording is not
being made by law enforcement officials); In re Use of Recording Devices in Connection
with Telephone Service, 12 F.C.C. 1005, 1006-07 (requiring the use of a "beep tone"
warning whenever a conversation is being recorded automatically), modified, 12 F.C.C.
1008 (1947), modified 57 F.C.C.2d 334 (1975).
47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILry Canon 9 (1980).
48. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rules 4.1, 8.4(c) (1983); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmiLITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980).
49. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974).
50. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1320
(1975) (barring recording by private investigator who is not an employee of the attorney
but who is aiding in the preparation of the case).
51. See generally Dallas Bar Ass'n Op., 1981-5 (reported in [Ethics Opinions] Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:8403 (1984)); Haw. S. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., For-
mal Op. 30 (1988) (reported in [Manual] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
901:2801 (April 26, 1989)); Ind. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 2-1975 (reported in 0. MARu, Dz-
GEST OF BAR AssOCIA TON ETmics OPINIONS 1 8457 (Supp. 1975)); Minn. Lawyer's Profes-
sional Responsibility Bd., Op. 3 (1986) (reported in [Manual] Law. Man. on Prof. Con-
duct (ABA/BNA) 901:5025 (March 18, 1987)); Mo. Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 7 (1978)
1991] 1001
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of anyone without full disclosure.52 Other state opinions have more
limited application and prohibit a private attorney from recording
other attorneys,53 clients,54 or other persons.5 5 Only one state that has
addressed the issue has determined that the surreptitious recording of
"clients, witness, or other lawyers" is not unethical.56
As observed earlier, 57 it often is difficult to determine whether the
court abhors the act of recording or the circumstances surrounding the
recording. In People ex rel. Attorney General v. Ellis5 the defendant
lawyer, Ellis, participated in the installation of microphones in the Col-
orado Governor's office. The Attorney General alleged that Ellis had
made the recordings in the context of representing a client, with the
intent of "using improper means to influence legislation, and stirring
up litigation . . . ."9 Ellis admitted that he made the recordings, but
denied the motive the Attorney General attributed to his actions.60
Once Ellis admitted he had secretly monitored conversations in the
Governor's office, the Attorney General instituted an action to disbar
(reported in 0. MARu, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS % 11807 (Supp.
1980)); Wis. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 75-3 (1975) (reported in 0. MARU, DIGEST OF BAR Asso-
CIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 11 10183 (Supp. 1975)).
52. Alaska Bar Ass'n, Op. 83-2 (1983) (reported in [Ethics Opinions] Law. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:1201 (Jan. 23, 1985)); Colo. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 22
(1962) (reported in 0. MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 550 (1970));
Mich. State Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 200 (n.d.) (reported in 0. MARU, DIGEST OF BAR
ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 11603 (Supp. 1980)); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 328
(1974) (reported in 0. MARu, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS % 9088 (Supp.
1975)); Or. State Bar As'n, Op. 392 (1978) (reported in 0. MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCI-
ATION ETHICS OPINIONS 12658 (Supp. 1980)); Tex. State Bar As'n, Op. 392 (1978) (re-
ported in 0. MARu, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 12750 (Supp. 1980)).
53. Ariz. State Bar As'n, Op. 176A (1965 (reported in 0. MARU, DIGEST OF BAR
ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 7 5923 (1970)); Cleveland Bar ASs'n, Op. 35 (1962) (re-
ported in 0. MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 3591 (1970)); Los
Angeles Bar As'n, Op. 272 (reported in 0. MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS
OPINIONS 515 (1970)); N.D. Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 17 (1975) (reported in 0. MARu,
DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 1 12506 (Supp. 1980)).
54. Cleveland Bar As'n, Op. 35 (1962) (reported in 0. MARu, DIGEST OF BAR Asso-
CIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 1 3591 (1970)).
55. Ariz. State Bar As'n, Op. 74-18 (1974) (reported in 0. MARu, DIGEST OF BAR
ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 1 7620 (Supp. 1975)), modified by Ariz. State Bar As'n,
Op. 75-13 (1975) (reported in 0. MARu, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS
7653 (Supp. 1975)) (recognizing four exceptions to the general ban on recordings for law
enforcement); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Op. 61-6 (1961) (reported in 0. MARu, DIGEST OF
BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 1 4034 (1970)).
56. Utah State Bar As'n, Op. 90 (undated) (reported in [Manual] Law. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901:8502 (Dec. 20, 1989)).
57. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
58. 101 Colo. 101, 70 P.2d 346 (1937).
59. Id. at 106, 70 P.2d at 348.
60. Id.
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Ellis. The Colorado Supreme Court granted a summary suspension
pending the outcome of criminal proceedings brought pursuant to the
secret monitoring. The court characterized the attorney's conduct as
"evil, shocking to all fine sensibilities, [and] violative of the American
conception of the decencies, and potentially inimical to free govern-
ment."'8 1 The strong language underscores the target of the espionage,
the Governor, rather than the actual recording.
6 2
The dissenting justice argued that the court should postpone the
disciplinary determination until after the conclusion of the criminal
proceedings.63 However, the dissent similarly disapproved of the attor-
ney's eavesdropping on the Governor's conversations.6 4 Justice Burke
suggested that a lawyer's motive and intent in making the recording
should be analyzed and considered to mitigate discipline, particularly
because the Attorney General charged Ellis with improper motive.6 1
Ellis was readmitted to the bar on his petition for a final order.66
The court noted that Ellis had been indicted on a misdemeanor charge
of eavesdropping and found guilty by the petit jury. The court stressed
that the wrong was infiltrating the statehouse, however, not covertly
recording nonprivileged conversations. 67
The Colorado Supreme Court's most recent disciplinary action in-
volving a private attorney engaged in undisclosed recording resulted in
a public censure. In People v. Wallin the lawyer represented an indi-
61. Id. at 103, 70 P.2d at 347.
62. The order calling for Ellis's initial disciplinary hearing stressed that he "wrong-
fully, lawfully, secretly and clandestinely . . .eavesdropp[ed] and sp[ied]" upon the
Governor's private conversations and official deliberations. Id. at 102, 70 P.2d at 346-47.
63. Id. at 106, 70 P.2d at 348 (Burke, J., dissenting). Justice Burke noted that the
criminal charges pending against the attorney required the state to prove that the motive
in recording the conversation was to circulate "slanderous and mischievous tales." Id.
64. Justice Burke stated: "I share the common detestation of 'snooping.' . .. If
[Ellis] did what he admits, plus all the Attorney General charges, and with the motives
imputed, I think he should be disciplined, possibly disbarred, not because his actions
would be illegal, but because they would be indecent, unworthy a lawyer." Id. at 107, 70
P.2d at 349.
65. Id.
66. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Ellis, 103 Colo. 344, 86 P.2d 247 (1938). Ellis
was restored to practice based solely on a prior decision readmitting another attorney
who also had been suspended indefinitely for unlawful entry. Id. at 346, 86 P.2d at 247;
see People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Kelley, 87 Colo. 88, 285 P. 767 (1980).
67. Ellis, 103 Colo. at 345, 86 P.2d at 247. The court noted that Ellis supplied the
funds to purchase and install the recording equipment, supplied the funds to pay stenog-
raphers to transpose the conversations, and bribed a janitor to obtain keys to the state
house and offices inside the state house. Id. at 345-46, 86 P.2d at 247. Justice Burke
concurred in the order, but stressed that the attorney had been cleared of "all personal
interest and evil intent." Id. at 347, 86 P.2d at 248.
68. 621 P.2d 330 (Colo. 1981).
1991] 1003
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vidual charged with burglary. At Wallin's instigation, the client called
the victim, Daines, and asked him not to identify the stolen items,
which had been recovered from a local pawn shop. The client then
urged Daines to contact Wallin directly. Daines notified the police, who
advised him to call Wallin and secretly record the conversation. 9
Daines and Wallin discussed the burglary twice by telephone. Wal-
lin suggested that Daines drop the investigation and that Daines hire
Wallin to preserve confidentiality under the attorney-client privilege. A
grievance was filed based on these recordings. Sometime after filing,
Wallin called Daines to discuss the disciplinary action, and surrep-
tiously recorded their conversation.
7 0
The court determined that Wallin's recording of the telephone
conversation with Daines violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4).7 1 This
case was complicated by the clearly improper content of the lawyer's
conversations with the victim. However, the court considered as miti-
gating factors the attorney's lack of experience7 2 and that the attorney
did not personally benefit from the misconduct.
73
A party does not have to disclose expressly to another party that a
conversation is being recorded. In Netterville v. Mississippi State
Bar74 the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to discipline an attorney
alleged to have made a recording of a conversation with a witness. Net-
terville represented a plaintiff in a products liability claim against a
corporation. In an effort to schedule depositions with stockholders, the
attorney contacted a stockholder who was a potential witness and ob-
tained the names and addresses of other stockholders the attorney
wished to depose. Although the attorney denied that he recorded the
conversation, he admitted that a secretary monitored and transcribed
the conversation in shorthand.
7 5
The court determined that the attorney had not engaged in uneth-
ical conduct because the nature of the conversation must have put the
other party on notice that the information was being recorded in some
manner. Netterville appears to allow a nonmechanical s transcription
69. Id. at 331.
70. Id.
71. DR 1-102(A)(4) provides in pertinent part that "A lawyer shall not ... engage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." MODEL CODE OF
PROPESSIONAL RESPONsImmrry DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980).
72. The attorney had been practicing for approximately three years but had been a
solo practitioner for less than one year. Wallin had handled only one prior felony. People
v. Wallin, 621 P.2d 330, 331-32 (1981).
73. Id.
74. 397 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1981).
75. Id. at 880-81.
76. The court distinguished J.C. Penney Co. v. Blush, 356 So. 2d 590 (Miss. 1978),
see infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text, by noting that insufficient evidence ex-
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of a conversation when the other party knows or should know that the
information is being preserved.
The South Carolina Supreme Court issued a private reprimand to
a lawyer who recorded a telephone conversation with a potential adver-
sary." The attorney, who represented a family member who had been
involved in an automobile accident, contacted the other driver in the
collision and secretly recorded their conversation. Moreover, the attor-
ney identified himself as merely his client's cousin and not as an attor-
ney. The attorney sought to use the recording two years later at the
driver's deposition.
78
The hearing panel concluded that making the recording did not
constitute professional misconduct. The court disagreed and held that
an attorney violates DR 1-102(A)(4) when he makes "a recording of a
conversation with an adversary or a potential adversary without the
knowledge and consent of all parties to the conversation. 79 The court
implied that although the attorney's behavior demanded a harsher
punishment than that imposed, the court would be lenient because of
the novelty of the question. 0
The South Carolina Supreme Court has placed a strict ban on the
secret recording of any conversation, regardless of the purpose for
which the recording was made. In In re Anonymous Member of the
South Carolina Bar8' the attorney argued that the secret recording was
merely "an alternative means of taking notes"8 2 and the recording was
not used to gain an unfair advantage over the other parties to the
conversation.
Noting that the issue had been presented to the court on two prior
occasions, s" the court reaffirmed its prior holdings that "an attorney
shall not record a conversation or any portion of a conversation of any
person whether by tape or other electronic device, without the prior
isted to establish that the attorney in this case had recorded the conversation. Netter-
uille, 397 So. 2d at 883. In addition, the court noted that the J.C. Penney decision dealt
with the attorney's dual role as an advocate and a witness. Id.
77. In re Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 283 S.C. 369, 322 S.E.2d 667 (1984).
78. Id. at 371, 322 S.E.2d at 668.
79. Id. at 372, 322 S.E.2d at 669. The court adopted the panel's recommendation
that failure to identify oneself as an attorney constitutes "conduct involving misrepre-
sentation." Id. at 371, 322 S.E.2d at 669.
80. Id.; c.f. In re Warner, 286 S.C. 459, 335 S.E.2d 90 (1985) (despite the novel
question, the court publicly reprimanded a lawyer for instructing a client to record a
conversation secretly with a family court judge). See supra notes 18-26 and accompany-
ing text.
81. - S.C. ., 404 S.E.2d 513 (1991).
82. Id. at -, 404 S.E.2d at 514.
83. See In re Warner, 286 S.C. 459, 335 S.E.2d 90 (1985); In re Anonymous Mem-
ber of the S.C. Bar, 283 S.C. 369, 322 S.E.2d 667 (1984).
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knowledge and consent of all parties to the conversation." 4 The court
stated that this rule would be applied "irrespective of the purpose(s)
for which such recordings were made, the intent of the parties to the
conversation, whether anything of a confidential nature was discussed,
and whether any party gained an unfair advantage from the
recordings."' 5
Unlike the court in Netterville,8 the South Carolina Supreme
Court clearly has rejected the notion that a party may be given notice
that a recording is being made based on the content of the conversa-
tion. In addition, this case appears to have none of the complicated
facts of the prior cases presented to the South Carolina Supreme
Court, and thus makes clear that it is the act of secretly recording
which is the evil, and not the use to which the recording is put.
In Gunter v. Virginia State Bar87 the Virginia Supreme Court sus-
pended an attorney for thirty days because he advised his client to
record conversations secretly. The attorney represented the husband in
a divorce proceeding in which the husband suspected his wife of adul-
tery. The husband authorized the recording of conversations in his
home and, at the direction of the attorney, placed a recording device
on the telephone. The recordings did not produce any evidence of
adultery, but the lawyer obtained information about the legal advice
given to the wife by her attorney. When the wife learned that her tele-
phone conversations had been monitored, she brought a criminal
charge against the attorney, alleging violation of the state wiretap stat-
ute. The trial court acquitted the attorney. s 8
The court found that even though the lawyer was not guilty of any
criminal violation under state law, his actions were dishonest and de-
ceitful, and violated DR 1-102(A)(4). s8 The court observed that the
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility imposes a higher standard
of conduct on attorneys than merely avoiding criminal activity. The
court did not decide whether it would have been improper for the law-
yer to record a conversation to which he was a party." Accordingly, the
court's holding extends only to conversations recorded by third persons
but authorized by the attorney.
84. Anonymous Member, - S.C. at -, 404 S.E.2d at 514.
85. Id. at -, 404 S.E.2d at 514.
86. 397 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1981).
87. 238 Va. 617, 385 S.E.2d 597 (1989).
88. Id. at 620, 385 S.E.2d at 599.
89. The court did not address whether the attorney's conduct violated the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988).
90. Indeed, it was on this basis that the court distinguished ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974). Gunter, 283 Va. at 622, 385
S.E.2d at 600.
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The Gunter court objected to the use the attorney made of the
recordings rather than the act of recording. The attorney used the re-
cordings to get information to aid his client in settlement negotia-
tions. 1 The court characterized Gunter's efforts as an attempt to en-
snare an adversary.92 Because the attorney displayed an utter disregard
for the confidential nature of the wife's conversations, the court found
that the punishment was justified.
V. RECORDING CLIENTS
The ABA also disapproves of a lawyer's secretly recording tele-
phone conversations between himself and his client. The attorney must
inform the client that a verbatim record of their conversation is being
made.93 According to the ABA, secretly recording a client creates
problems both because the attorney made the recording and because
the attorney may disclose the substance of the recording.9 4 The lawyer
has an obligation to maintain the confidences of his client, and to
deal with clients candidly and fairly. According to the ABA, making
verbatim records of conversations requires both disclosure to the client
and preservation of attorney-client confidences.
9 7
Informal opinion 1008 may extend to more than the recording of
conversations because it condemns "verbatim records" of conversations
without full disclosure to the other party. The phrase "verbatim rec-
ord" encompasses more than the mechanical reproduction of sound
91. Gunter, 283 Va. at 620, 385 S.E.2d at 599.
92. Id. at 622, 385 S.E.2d at 600.
93. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1008
(1967).
94. Id.
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6 (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980); CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon
37 (1956). The committee noted that exceptions may exist to the attorney-client privi-
lege which may or may not make the recording "legally appropriate or legally not appro-
priate." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1008
(1967).
96. The committee cited two former decisions that impose a duty of fairness in
dealings with clients: ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 7
(1925) (an attorney should avoid misstatement in letter to collect fees from a client), and
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 262 (unpublished) (an
attorney should not attempt to enforce a statute of limitations when a client seeks repay-
ment of money loaned to the attorney). In addition, the committee cited ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 1009 (1967), which recognized that it is
improper to record another attorney secretly. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying
text.
97. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1008
(1967).
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and could comprise any method by which the conversation is
preserved.98
In several cases, private attorneys have agreed to record conversa-
tions with their clients at the request of law enforcement officials. 9 In
United States v. Ofshe the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
a defendant's Sixth Amendment claim that his attorney's cooperation
with the federal government violated his constitutional rights.100 The
defendant's attorney collaborated with the Assistant United States At-
torney in order to "diminish his own criminal responsibility" 101 when
he discovered that he was a target of a federal corruption investigation.
The attorney agreed to provide the government with information about
Ofshe's subsequent criminal conduct. The court rejected Ofshe's con-
stitutional claim because Ofshe suffered no prejudice in his criminal
defense. 10 2 Also, the court was satisfied that confidential information
obtained by the attorney was sufficiently protected. 0 3 The court held
that, although the attorney's conduct was reprehensible, it was not suf-
ficiently outrageous to warrant dismissing the indictment. However,
the court assumed the district judge would refer the matter to the At-
torney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
0 4
The Colorado Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Peo-
ple v. Smith.0 5 The court suspended an attorney who aided law en-
forcement officers by recording confidential communications with a
former client. Smith, the attorney, had agreed to cooperate after his
arrest for simple possession of cocaine. Smith argued that his conduct
should be an exception to the ethical considerations because he was
acting at the direction of law enforcement personnel. The court re-
jected his argument and observed that Smith was a private, not a pros-
ecuting, attorney and so he could not benefit from the prosecutorial
98. For example, it is unclear whether a verbatim record of part of a conversation
in the form of notes made by the attorney would be prohibited. ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1008 (1967) bars a third person's unre-
vealed shorthand recording of the conversation. See Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar,
397 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1981); see also supra notes 74-76.
99. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974)
recognizes an exception to its general prohibition of secret recordings in favor of law
enforcement officers. Formal opinion 337 parallels the law enforcement exception enunci-
ated in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520
(1988).
100. 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
101. Id, at 1511.
102. Id. at 1516.
103. Id, The attorney general took pains to protect privileged attorney-client con-
vereations and did not discover any defense strategy. Id.
104. Id. at 1516 n.6.
105. 778 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1989).
1008 [Vol. 42
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exception.1 0 8
When a private attorney participates in the investigation of his
client by secretly recording conversations with his client, ethical con-
siderations regarding conflicts of interest develop beyond those embod-
ied in rules of professional conduct. 10 7 The incentive to cooperate often
results from an arrest or criminal investigation of the attorney. A con-
flict of interest arises when a lawyer agrees to record his conversations
with clients in exchange for leniency in his own case. The attorney
must fully disclose his interest and actions to the client to cure the
conflict. The attorney thereafter may continue representation only
with the client's consent. 08
Moreover, a lawyer has an obligation to maintain client confi-
dences. 09 An attorney breaches his duty by secretly recording conver-
sations with his client for the benefit of the government. The justifica-
tion for the duty to maintain client confidences lies in the importance
of the attorney's ability to communicate fully and frankly with his cli-
ent.110 This principle would be severely undermined if an attorney
could secretly cooperate with the government's investigation of a crimi-
nal defendant who also is a client.
The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and only the cli-
ent can waive the privilege."' When an attorney cooperates with law
enforcement officials he waives the privilege without his client's con-
sent. This result clearly is inconsistent with the concept that the privi-
lege belongs to the client.
VI. THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT EXCEPTION
Several states recognize exceptions to the general ban on secret
recordings when private attorneys defend criminal defendants. The
Kentucky Bar Association justified the exception on the grounds of
protecting the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.1
2
106. Id. at 687.
107. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONsmiLmy DR 5-101(A) (1980).
108. See supra text accompanying note 101.
109. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1980). Despite this obligation, both standards
allow an attorney to reveal his client's intent to commit a crime, as well as information
necessary to prevent the crime. The exception applies solely to inchoate crimes, however,
and not to the investigation of the client's prior criminal conduct.
110. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment (1983); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980).
111. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.4.1 (1986).
112. Ky. Bar Ass'n, Op. E-279 (1984) (reported in [Ethics Opinions] Law. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:3909 (Jan. 23, 1985)).
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A government prosecutor may gather and seek the admission of
secretly recorded conversations made by the defendant. Conversely, a
private attorney cannot secretly record conversations, but simply may
present testimony on behalf of his client. A recording preserves the
conversation in its original form and therefore cannot be impeached on
the grounds of poor memory, bias, or prejudice. Live testimony, how-
ever, suffers all of these weaknesses. Thus, the defendant is unable to
rebut state evidence with the same quality of evidence as the govern-
ment offers. This limitation may offend notions of fundamental fair-
ness guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The committee also
stressed the attorney's duty to represent his client competently and
zealously.'1 3
The New York City Bar Association also recognizes the permissi-
bility of secret recordings by private attorneys engaged to represent
criminal defendants.""4 The committee extended the exception to se-
cret recordings made prior to indictment if the attorney has reasonable
grounds to believe his client is under investigation. Although the com-
mittee did not give its reasons for reaching this conclusion, the exten-
sion is not based on the Sixth Amendment because the Sixth Amend-
ment does not apply to the preindictment phase."' One party must
consent to the recording pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.116
The Ethics Committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility
of the Tennessee Supreme Court also allows secret recordings by pri-
vate attorneys engaged to represent criminal defendants, even in the
preindictment phase. 17 However, Tennessee confines the use of record-
ings to impeachment of potentially adverse witnesses at trial.
Tennessee also allows the recording of a statement when the state-
ment itself is "a felonious crime."" 8' The problem with this exception is
that it would be difficult to record the statement unless the attorney
already was engaged in recording the conversation. If the statement is
not made, the attorney has exceeded the terms of the exception. The
Ethics Committee probably envisioned a motive analysis of the record-
113. Id.; see also MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101, DR 7-101 (1980).
114. New York City Bar Ass'n, Op. 80-95 (1980) (reported in [Ethics Opinions] Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:6318 (1984)).
115. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no right to counsel prior to indict-
ment or the filing of formal charges).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988). See supra note 46.
117. Ethics Comm. of the Bd. of Professional Responsibility of the Tenn. Supreme
Court, Op. 86-F-14(a) (1986) (reported in [Manual] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/
BNA) 901:3101 (Nov. 11, 1987)).
118. Id.
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ing based on the intent of the attorney who makes the recording, to
determine whether the recording falls within the exception.
At least one state specifically prohibits attorneys representing
criminal defendants from authorizing or assisting clients to record
secretly telephone conversations with co-defendants. 119 Attorneys also
may not request the police to record conversations. The opinion should
be read narrowly, however, because the facts reveal the attorney's cli-
ent had admitted his guilt. If applied literally, the opinion has serious
implications that pertain to the plea bargaining process. Many defense
attorneys encourage their clients to cooperate with authorities investi-
gating other crimes in exchange for leniency. The opinion does not
raise or address the constitutional implications of prohibiting the crim-
inal defense attorney from secretly recording conversations. 120
VII COUNSELLING CLIENTS REGARDING SECRET RECORDING
As previously noted, ABA informal opinion 1320 prohibits attor-
neys from using third persons to record secretly conversations that the
attorneys could not ethically record without making full disclosure.1
21
Several states have wrestled with the extent to which an attorney may
counsel a client about recording conversations when the client-requests
advice. Serious First and Fourteenth Amendment problems may arise
if the state intrudes upon the attorney-client relationship by interfer-
ing with the free flow of information between the parties.
An attorney may not counsel or assist his client to engage in illegal
activity.112 However, in the absence of a state law that requires full
disclosure prior to recording, if one party consents to the secret record-
ing the client acts within the law when he makes a secret recording.
2
3
119. Va. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 848 (1986) (reported in [Manual] Law. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901:8712 (Dec. 20, 1989)).
120. See Gunter v. Virginia State Bar, 238 Va. 617, 385 S.E.2d 597 (1989) and see
supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text. The Virginia Supreme Court refused to rule
on the validity of the prosecutorial exception.
121. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
122. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmIIrry DR 1-102(A)(8), DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980).
123. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(c)
(1988). See also Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Op. 683 (1945) (reported in 0.
MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHics OPINIONS 317 (1970)). The New York opin-
ion warns that an attorney should not advise or participate in a client's attempt to get
evidence of a spouse's infidelity by placing a dictaphone in the home. Such conduct is
illegal after the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
because the dictaphone would record conversations without the consent of any party to
the conversation. Assisting the client in illegal conduct patently violates ethical
standards.
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Therefore, no explicit authority arises in the ethical rules that restrains
an attorney from advising his client on the legality or illegality of se-
cret recordings, provided the client, or someone else who is a party to
the conversation, consents. Indeed, "[a] lawyer is required to give an
honest opinion about the legal consequences that appear likely to re-
sult from a client's conduct.
'124
Several ethics committees adopted a compromise between the
need for attorneys to advise clients regarding legal implications of se-
cret recordings and the legal profession's historical distaste for secret
recordings. For example, the New York State Bar Association permits
attorneys to counsel clients in certain circumstances regarding the se-
cret recording of conversations to which clients are parties.125 Likewise,
the Kentucky Bar Association has stated that if a client inquires about
the legality of a recorded conversation, the attorney may advise the
client of the legal consequences involved and the propriety of the re-
cording. 2 The opinion expressly prohibits the attorney from sug-
gesting that the client secretly record conversations with other people,
even conversations to which the client is a party.127
VIII. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SECRET RECORDINGS MADE BY PRIVATE
COUNSEL IN THE CONTEXT OF LITIGATION
If an attorney records a conversation without disclosure to the
other parties, the question arises whether the attorney is permitted to
use the recording to represent his client. The Mississippi Supreme
Court has held that these recordings are generally admissible. In ad-
dressing this issue, the court did not consider ethical issues to deter-
mine the recording's admissibility.
2 8
In J.C. Penney, Inc. v. Blush"2 the attorney for the plaintiff tried
to introduce a recorded conversation between himself and a defense
witness. The witness discovered that the conversation had been re-
corded when he took the stand to testify at trial. The witness claimed
124. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.2 comment (1983).
125. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 515 (1979) (reported in 0. MARu, DIGEST OF BAR
ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS T 433 (Supp. 1980)). The opinion does not discuss the cir-
cumstances under which counseling is proper.
126. Ky. Bar Ass'n, Op. E-289 (1984) (reported in [Ethics Opinions] Law. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:3910 (Jan. 23, 1985)). The opinion expressly provides
that the attorney does not need to confine his explanation to legal considerations.
127. Id.
128. Wilkins v. Bancroft, 248 Miss. 622, 160 So. 2d 93 (1964). At trial, the plaintiff
introduced a tape recording made by a machine placed in the defendant's office by a
private investigator. Id. at 627, 160 So. 2d at 95.
129. 356 So. 2d 590 (Miss. 1978).
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the recording had been altered. The attorney took the stand to testify
that the tape had not been altered and subsequently argued to the jury
the issue of his own credibility. The court cautioned the lawyer about
the use of the recording on retrial, and noted that an attorney should
avoid "the dual role of an attorney testifying as a witness in a case in
which he also [is] actively engaged in representing one of the par-
ties."'130 Although the court addressed the impropriety of the recording,
it emphasized the attorney's role as a witness as the true evil.
In a later case, National Life & Accident Insurance Co. v.
Miller,"" the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rul-
ing on the admissibility of a taped conversation between the plaintiff
and the defendant's insurance agent. The plaintiffs attorney had re-
corded the conversation secretly. The court noted that although it did
not approve of the attorney's actions in making the recording, 3 2 it was
not reversible error to admit the recording at trial because the defend-
ant's agent admitted the conversation and its contents.' 3'
Miller appears to limit the holding of Blush to cases in which the
attorney is called to testify about the accuracy of the recording. Miller
establishes a rule of admissibility based on a party's stipulation or ad-
mission that the recording is an accurate rendition of the conversation.
In other words, admissibility does not depend on the propriety of the
recording itself. Rather, the test for admission is whether the attorney
will have to engage in further inappropriate conduct to seek its intro-
duction. If this is the standard, a conversation to which the attorney
was not a party seems to be admissible for any purpose under this rule
because in no event would the attorney be called on to testify about
the accuracy of the recording.
IX. CONCLUSION
Ethical opinions are merely advisory and are not binding on
courts. Ethical opinions generally are rendered based on a set of facts
submitted to a bar association and may not reflect the feelings of the
judges who ultimately decide on the propriety of an attorney's conduct.
However, some opinions, such as ABA formal opinion 337, are so
widely accepted that they set a true standard of conduct. The reported
130. Id. at 594. The court cites ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 337 (1974) for the proposition that "no lawyer should record any conver-
sation whether by tapes or other electronic device, without the consent or prior knowl-
edge of all parties to the conversation." Id.
131. 484 So. 2d 329 (Miss. 1985).
132. The telephone call was placed and the recording was made from the attorney's
office. Id. at 331.
133. Id. at 338.
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decisions of disciplinary actions indicate how particular courts will
treat a similar case, but these decisions are often complicated by facts
unrelated to the act of recording. In addition, the language used by the
court to chastise the attorney is often more severe than the punish-
ment imposed.
The overwhelming conclusion as established by the ethical opin-
ions, disciplinary proceedings, and case law is that secret recording by
nongovernment attorneys is not favored by American courts. Courts
historically characterize the secret recording of conversations as deceit-
ful, tricky, and unfair. An attorney may interview a witness, subse-
quently write a memorandum of the conversation, and later testify
about the contents of the conversation. Therefore, it is not the repeti-
tion of the content of the conversation that is impermissible. Rather,
the courts and ethical committees state that the act of recording with-
out full disclosure violates ethical duties.
Traditionally, the cases and ethical opinions have cited DR 1-
102(A)(4) as prohibiting secret recordings. The rule condemns "con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." 34 This
rule applies to any conduct in which an attorney engages, even outside
the scope of his professional duties. Taken to their logical conclusions,
the ethical opinions and cases prohibit attorneys from secret recordings
even in a nonprofessional capacity.
When considered in context, the true justification for prohibiting
recordings lies in the relationship between attorneys, their clients, the
judicial system, and the public at large. There appears to be a public
perception that one can tell an attorney anything and it will not be
repeated. Although this is not necessarily true, it would be a breach of
public confidence if attorneys began recording their conversations with
the public and replaying them at their whim. Because attorneys nor-
mally deal in an adversarial situation, there is a certain amount of in-
hibition in the flow of communication between attorneys and the court.
If secret recordings were allowed, it would further complicate an al-
ready difficult communication system.
Ellen A. Mercer
134. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmiLrry DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980). See also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c) (1983).
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